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Do States Bargain Over
Investor-State Dispute
Settlement? Or, Toward
Greater Collaboration
in the Study of Bilateral
Investment Treaties
Jason Webb Yackee*

Abstract: In this Symposium Essay I argue that social scientists interested in the
empirical study of law-related phenomena should take greater advantage of
opportunities to collaborate with traditionally trained legal experts. Legal experts can
play a critical role in improving the quality of social scientific understandings and
operationalizations of law. The legal expert’s role should be considered as substantial and
important to the research enterprise, as it entails the verification that the social
scientist’s observations of law meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the theoretical
concepts of interest. I illustrate my argument by reference to a recent empirical study by
two political scientists that examines the extent to which states bargain over investorstate dispute settlement provisions in bilateral investment treaties.
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Do States Bargain Over Investor-State Dispute Settlement?

I. Introduction
This symposium essay was originally prepared for a workshop on the “Political Economy
of Bilateral Investment Treaties” organized by the London School of Economics. It was
subsequently presented at and refined for the Symposium that produced the papers
published in this volume of the Santa Clara Journal of International Law.
The LSE workshop brought together a group of prominent international legal experts,
political scientists, and economists. The workshop organizers asked participants to “discuss
research approaches and results, methodological challenges, and possibilities for future
collaboration” on the empirical study of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The discussion
at the workshop was fruitful and stimulating, as was the Symposium, and as I’ve reflected
on the exchanges I’ve come to accept as probably “true” two interrelated impressions.
First, traditionally trained legal experts interested in the empirical study of BITs
typically don’t know much about the modern statistical methods of theory-testing and causal
inference that underlie many social scientific studies of investment treaties. This impression
is probably not too surprising. As two prominent political scientists pointed out several years
ago, even self-consciously “empirical” legal academics often violate social scientific norms of
empirical inquiry.1 Legal experts typically have no formal training in social science methods,
and there are few professional incentives for them to learn those methods, or to apply them
in ways recognized as appropriate by the social scientific community.
But second, and more surprisingly (at least to me), it seems that social scientists
interested in BIT questions but untrained in law itself often don’t know much about how
legal experts involved in the BIT community experience and understand the law of BITs.
That gap between law as viewed by social scientists and law as viewed by legal experts was
especially evident in discussions of how social scientists had constructed key concepts (such
as the “strength” of investment treaties), or in how they operationalized those concepts as
variables in statistical analyses. While statistical tests of social phenomena always require
the simplification of complex realities into the numerical scales and categories that make
statistics possible, in some important cases it seemed as if the social scientists had simply
gotten the law “wrong” in some objective sense.
If those two impressions are accurate, they are positive in the sense of suggesting that
lawyers and social scientists enjoy room to collaborate in a fruitful and mutual way. The
notion that lawyers and social scientists should collaborate is not new, of course. In recent
years legal academics have been accused, probably with some degree of justification, for
naively and perhaps negligently ignoring essentially sound and fundamental rules of causal
inference when making and testing claims about how the world works. Perhaps the most
well-known and scathing critique is contained in a 2002 article by political scientists Epstein

1.

Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002) (providing a scathing
critique).
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and King.2 They argue that virtually all empirical studies in law reviews fundamentally
violate basic norms of acceptable empirical research and are largely inferentially worthless.3
While Epstein and King’s critique doesn’t explicitly call on law professors to embrace
quantitative/statistical research methodologies, their admonitions can be viewed as
representing a certain kind of “statistical worldview”4 that is today well represented in the
burgeoning “empirical legal studies” (ELS) movement.5
It seems supportable to hold that the legal academy is ill suited to autonomously
producing sophisticated or even high-quality empirical (and especially quantitative) studies
of law. This is due to such things as a lack of methodological training and, probably less
importantly, the lack of a peer-review process that might, in theory, prevent poor-quality
empirical studies of law from being published in the first place.6 One solution that is
sometimes mentioned is to promote collaboration between social scientists and law
professors.7 But such calls can seem one-sided, with the benefits of collaboration presumed
to flow in a single direction—from the methodologically well-trained social scientist to the
methodologically naïve or illiterate legal scholar. In this view, the primary aim of
collaboration seems to be to improve the empirical scholarship of legal academics, and not
(mutually or instead) to improve the law-related empirical scholarship of non-lawyer social
scientists.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.
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Id.
Id. See also Gregory Mitchell, Essay, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83 N.C.
L. REV. 167, 171-172 (2004).
As McKeown has called it, criticizing similar arguments made by King in an earlier book aimed at
political scientists. Timothy J. McKeown, Case studies and the statistical worldview, 53 INT’L ORG.
1 (1999).
Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools,
81 IND. L.J. 141 (2006) (praising empirical legal studies as “arguably the next big thing in
legal intellectual thought”); Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, And Promise of
Empirical Legal Studies and a Response to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713 (2011)
(describing the history of the empirical legal studies movement).
Lee Epstein & Gary King, Building an Infrastructure for Empirical Research in Law, 53 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 311 (2003) (advocating that law reviews incorporate a peer-review process); Elizabeth
Chambliss, When Do Facts Persuade? Some Thoughts on the Market for “Empirical Legal Studies,”
71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 26 (2008) (“most criticism of empirical research by law professors
is based on quality. . . . Most of this critique is aimed at law reviews and the unique conventions of
law-review publishing”). Of course, peer-reviewed law reviews would do nothing to encourage or
enable law professors to produce empirical research of social scientific quality. It would only—in
theory—prevent “bad” research from being published.
Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the
Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 367 (1995) (advocating for
collaboration); Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 81718 (1999) (suggesting same); Edward L. Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law
Scholarship, 89 MICH. L. REV. 792, 828-829 (1991); Marin Roger Scordato, Reflections on the
Nature of Legal Scholarship in the Post-Realist Era, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 353, 386 n.129
(2008).
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In this essay I suggest that there is, in fact, much to be gained by social scientists from
collaboration with traditionally trained law professors or lawyers (collectively, “legal
experts”). Where the social scientist is interested in producing an empirical study about law,
whether law is taken as a dependent or independent variable, the legal expert can play an
especially valuable role helping to ensure the validity of the social scientist’s measurements
of legally related phenomena. This role should be considered as substantial and important to
the research enterprise, as it entails the verification that the social scientist’s observations of
law “meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the theoretical concept[s]” of the study.8
The remainder of the Essay proceeds as follows. First, in Section 2 I describe in general
terms the potential contribution of the legal expert to social scientific studies of law and lawrelated phenomena. Then, in Section 3, I provide a concrete example of the problem that
collaboration with legal experts might help mitigate, focusing on a recent social scientific
study of bilateral investment treaties that contains conceptualizations of international law
that, in my view, would have benefitted from legal expertise. In Section 4, I draw on legal
expertise ISDS to suggest three basic legal “facts” about ISDS that might inform a social
scientific examination of the question of whether and how states bargain over ISDS. Section
5 then applies those facts to recode the dependent variable of the original social scientific
study discussed earlier. Section 6 presents a sample statistical analysis demonstrating how
empirical results are materially sensitive to the recoding exercise. Section 7 provides a brief
conclusion.

II. The Potential Contribution of the Legal Expert
By helping to ensure what we can call “measurement validity”9 the legal expert can
improve the soundness of the social scientist’s causal inferences, and of the policy
recommendations that may be derived from those inferences. In the process, he also helps
build better theories, as good theories depend upon sufficiently “realistic” conceptualizations
of the underlying phenomena that are to be measured.
The legal expert does this by helping the social scientist understand the “grammar” of the
relevant legal community. 10 As law professor Michael Byers has suggested in an essay that

8.
9.
10.

Robert Addock & David Collier, Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and
Quantitative Research, 95 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 529, 530 (2001) (discussing measurement
validity).
Id.
Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982). As Fiss argues,
Rules are not rules unless they are authoritative, and that authority can only be conferred by
a community. Accordingly, the disciplining rules that govern an interpretive activity must be
seen as defining or demarcating an interpretive community consisting of those who recognize
the rules as authoritative. This means, above all else, that the objective quality of
interpretation is bounded, limited, or relative. It is bounded by the existence of a community
that recognizes and adheres to the disciplining rules used by the interpreter and that is
defined by its recognition of those rules. Id. at 745.
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urges greater collaboration between international law experts and international relations
theorists, social scientists who study treaties have a history of “mishandling or ignoring . . .
concepts . . . that . . . appear[] basic to an international lawyer” but that “might seem
irrelevant or impenetrable to someone from another discipline”.11 The legal expert can help
to explain the content and relevance of those concepts by drawing on his familiarity with the
ways in which legal practitioners (and others engaged with the law on a regular basis) view
the relevant rules and institutions as constraining or providing opportunities for action.
Put a bit differently, empirical social-scientific studies of law, or that use law, are in a
very real sense dependent upon the juristic legal conceptions around which members of the
legal community coordinate their actions.12 To empirically study the law usually means
borrowing the meaning of law as understood by those who use it on a daily basis. As
Cotterrell notes, “the intellectual situation seems parallel to that in criminology. ‘Crime’
seems to be what the law says it is; ‘law’ seems to be what the state and the lawyers say it
is.”13
What Cotterrell has in mind, I think, is the notion that the legal community tends to
focus or coordinate around particular, shared understandings of what the law “is”, with a
sort of equilibrium achieved iteratively through the workings and interactions of individual
legal actors and legal institutions, constrained by the professions’ shared legal culture,
norms, outlooks, appreciations, and the like.14 The grammar of law is this shared
understanding (which can also be viewed in a Holmesian sense as a prediction of how other
members of the legal community will understand the law), where the grammar both
observes and influences the law.15
The legal expert’s formal training (which embeds certain skills and attitudes) and his
repeated social and professional interaction with other members of the legal community,
11.

12.
13.

14.
15.
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Michael Byers, Response: Taking the Law Out of International Law: A Critique of the
“Iterative Perspective,” 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 201, 205 (1997) (asserting that international
relations scholars who study treaties have a history of “mishandling or ignoring . . . concepts .
. . that . . . appear[] basic to an international lawyer” but that “might seem irrelevant or
impenetrable to someone from another discipline”).
Roger Cotterrell, Socio-Legal Studies, Law Schools, and Legal and Social Theory, (Queen
Mary Univ. of London, Sch. of L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 126, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154404.
Id. at 4. It’s also possible that social science can itself “cause” law, if the legal community
adopts social scientific arguments as to what the law is, or should be. Cf. Lawrence M.
Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763, 777 (1986) (“Legal
economists have a tendency to claim too much; they are notoriously imperial. . . . On the other
hand, [their] claim . . . may turn out to be true after all. This will happen if lawyers come to
believe in the claims, and if judges and administrators actually use economics to solve
problems.”). Note, however, the determinant position of lawyers here. It is they who decide
whether a social science understanding of law is transformed into actual law.
See Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law,
82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209 (2009) (describing law as the solution to a coordination game).
See Anthony D’Amato, Legal Realism Explains Nothing, 1 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 1 (2009)
(explaining the Holmesian “prediction theory” of law).
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means that the legal expert is in a potentially strong position to describe (or predict) the
community’s understanding of what law means or how law works. And because that
community is responsible for making the law work, their understandings act as law itself.
This predictive expertise is not easily gained by those outside of the profession, who lack the
requisite training and the access to (or patience for) the community’s conversations that are
often necessary for moving beyond simplistic and even wrong understandings of the law—for
example, law as what the law books say it is (excessive formalism) or law as “politics by
other means” (excessive cynicism).16

III.An Example of the Problem
I’ve suggested above that legal experts embody knowledge about the law (or about legal
systems, or legal institutions); and that, furthermore, non-law-trained political scientists
interested in empirically studying legal phenomena may benefit from collaboration with
legal experts in designing their theories and empirical tests thereof. Let’s turn now to an
example of the problem through an illustration of what I view as a positive (by which I mean
good, interesting) example of modern empirical political science/international relations
scholarship that nonetheless, I think, gets the law “wrong” in a way that detracts from the
persuasiveness of the article’s underlying theory and findings. The example is drawn from
the growing body of empirical studies of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
To offer some brief background: The BIT phenomenon has attracted significant
interdisciplinary and empirical attention, for the obvious reason that there are now roughly
3,000 signed investment treaties, virtually all of which contain binding state consents to
investor-initiated arbitration. The result has been an explosion of BIT-based litigation, with
the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
now having registered nearly as many investor-state arbitrations as the WTO has registered
trade disputes.17
Existing empirical studies of BITs can be broken into two basic and distinct lines of
research. On the one hand, a number of scholars from a variety of academic disciplines have
examined BITs as independent variables, looking at whether the treaties cause increases in
foreign direct investment (FDI).18 On the other hand, a somewhat smaller number of
16.

17.

18.

Albeit, to be fair, cynicism that is able to predict Supreme Court decisions with significant
accuracy, if not much theory. See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A
Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997) (reviewing and
critiquing such studies). One of Frank’s critiques is that these studies often contain overly
simplistic understandings of the “legal model” of judicial decision-making that purely political
models are often said to disprove.
At the date of writing, the ICSID website lists 449 registered disputes: 175 pending cases and 274
concluded
cases.
INT’l
CTR.
FOR
THE
SETTLEMENT
OF
INV.
DISPUTES,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ListCases
(last visited Oct. 17, 2013). The WTO website lists 434 registered disputes.
The most important empirical BIT studies are cited in Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral
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scholars, operating primarily within the discipline of political science, have examined BITs
as dependent variables, attempting to explain such things as why states sign BITs,19 or why
states sign BITs with particular provisions.20
I focus here on the second kind of study, a recent article by Professors Allee and
Peinhardt, both political scientists, that treats international investment law (BITs) as a
dependent variable. Their article, “Delegated Differences”, appeared in the 2010 volume of
the respected international relations journal International Studies Quarterly.21 By focusing
on their article, I do not mean to imply that it is a “bad” article, or that it is for some reason
especially deserving of criticism. Indeed, I view their empirical work on BITs, including
“Delegated Differences”, as providing valuable, important contributions to our thinking
about investment treaties. I focus here on their work simply because it provides a useful and
unusually clear example of how such work might be further improved through collaboration
with legal experts.
In “Delegated Differences”, Alee and Peinhardt are interested in explaining differences in
the texts of investment treaties. As is standard in political science research, they present
their empirical study in the context of testing a theory, here of state behavior (whether to
sign a BIT containing particular text) and based upon on an informal rational choice
bargaining model.
In thumbnail form, their theory proceeds as follows. Home and host states both want to
sign BITs (to protect investors on the one hand, and to promote inward investment on the
other). But the ideal-typical home and host states have different preferences as to the
content of the BITs they want to sign. Allee and Peinhardt believe, as do I, that the investorstate dispute settlement (ISDS) clauses of BITs are among the most important of the treaty
provisions (because they make BIT substantive guarantees enforceable, and thus credible),
and they argue that home-host bargaining will take place around ISDS clauses. In
particular, home states will want strong ISDS, while host states will want weak ISDS.
These predictions are based on the assumptions that host states are very concerned about
sacrificing sovereignty to ISDS tribunals, while home states are very concerned about
gaining access to ISDS to provide legal protection for their investors.22

19.
20.
21.
22.
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Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51
VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2011).
Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811 (2006).
Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 1 (2010).
Id.
Incidentally, I am not sure that this bargaining model makes much theoretical sense. If we
assume that developing countries sincerely desire more investment, and if we assume that they
are convinced that they need to sign investor-friendly BITs in order to attract that investment—
because investors demand “strong” BITs as a condition to invest—then why would those
developing states take a bargaining position in favor of “weak” BITs that will not attract
investment?
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To operationalize and test their theory, Allee and Peinhardt code the strength of ISDS
provisions (their dependent variable) by noting the dispute settlement fora to which each
BIT grants investors access. They also collect a number of independent variables measuring
concepts related to the strength of home state preferences for strong ISDS, the strength of
host state preferences for weak ISDS, and the balance of bargaining power between home
and host states. So, for example, where a home state has a strong preference for strong
ISDS, a host state has a weak preference for weak ISDS, and the home state enjoys
significant bargaining power, the model would predict the BIT to contain a strong ISDS
provision.
The key to the present discussion is the way in which Allee and Peinhardt conceptualize
and operationalize ISDS strength. The authors start from the well-supported observation
that the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) seems to be involved in the vast majority of known BIT arbitrations, and that ICSID
is plausibly said to enjoy some practical advantages over other arbitral mechanisms, such as
ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or institutional arbitration
managed by private organizations like the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). For
example, the ICSID Convention requires signatory states to enforce ICSID awards as if they
were non-appealable final domestic court judgments. In contrast, awards rendered under an
UNCITRAL or ICC process are enforced under the New York Convention, which governs the
international enforceability of international commercial arbitration awards more generally
and which contains a handful of escape clauses for states that wish to refuse enforcement.
From these observations about ICSID’s relative importance and its possible advantages
as an ISDS forum, Allee and Peinhardt make the facially plausible argument that ISDS
provisions that contain consents to ICSID arbitration are better (from the home state’s and
investor’s perspective) than are ISDS provisions that do not grant jurisdiction to ICSID. But
many BITs contain ISDS provisions that consent to ICSID arbitration and to alternatives
such as those mentioned in the previous paragraph. Other BITs contain consents to ICSID
alone. Some BITs don’t mention ICSID, but do contain consents to alternative fora. And yet
other BITs contain no ISDS provisions whatsoever. Allee and Peinhardt propose to rank
these four possibilities according to the concept of the amount of “delegation” to ICSID.23
They consider a BIT to contain a “full delegation” of dispute settlement authority to ICSID
where the treaty’s ISDS clause consents only to ICSID. This is, in their view, the “best” BIT
(from the home state’s perspective).
Second best is the BIT that consents to ICSID and to alternative fora. For Allee and
Peinhardt, this kind of ISDS provision represents a “partial delegation” of decision-making
authority to ICSID because the investor is free to invoke ICSID’s jurisdiction, or to choose a
non-ICSID option. Host states that seek to limit the extent of their sacrifice of sovereignty

23.

Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20, at 15 (describing their ranking scheme).
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will, according to this schema, prefer a “partial” rather than a “full” delegation. The
delegation is “partial” because ”multiple options for dispute settlement opens the door to
delay and removes the efficiency gains associated with exclusive delegation to ICSID.”24 And
finally, BITs that fail to contain any delegation to ICSID are the weakest. This category
seems to include both those BITs that consent to ICC or UNCITRAL arbitration (but not
ICSID) as well as those BITs that fail to contain effective, comprehensive ISDS clauses.25
Table 1, below, contains a summary of my understanding of their rank ordering scheme.
Table 1: Allee & Peinhardt’s Dependent Variable: Concept &
Operationalization
Rank Order

Concept

Operationalization

(Higher=Better)
2

Full

ICSID

delegation
1
0

Partial

Only

ICSID

arbitration
ICSID

ICSID + UNICTRAL

delegation

&/or other arbitration

No delegation to

UNCITRAL &/or other

ICSID,

arbitration

delegation

but
to

something else
0

No delegation to

No ISDS

anything

The authors test their theory statistically. They find that a number of their independent
variables are statistically significant and signed in the predicted direction. For example,
home states that have strong interests in a “full” delegation to ICSID are more likely to
enter into BITs with higher-ranked ISDS provisions. Host states that have a greater interest
in or need for FDI (measured by such things as their reliance on foreign aid) are also more
likely to consent to stronger ISDS provisions. Allee and Peinhardt conclude that for home
and host states, “the decision to delegate dispute settlement authority to ICSID has been an
important one.”26

24.
25.
26.
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Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20, at 7.
I say “seems” because Allee and Peinhardt do not expressly talk about the possibility of BITs that
fail to contain ISDS provisions. Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20.
Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20, at 24.
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IV. The Contribution of Legal Expertise
We can now begin to imagine how an expert in the law and practice of BITs, even one
with little or no statistical training, might have contributed meaningfully to the analysis,
making it potentially more realistic, or, at least, potentially more convincing to those
members of the relevant legal community.27 I organize the discussion around three basic
observations about IIL that I think are likely to be shared by most legal experts working in
the area but that are not necessarily obvious to non-legal experts: the value of ISDS of any
kind, the importance of context, and the use of model clauses.

A. The Value of ISDS of Any Kind
Let’s start at the bottom of Table 1. Lawyers are trained to appreciate that rights
unaccompanied by remedies are often of dubious value to the rights-holder. In that vein, and
as I have argued elsewhere, BITs that contain no ISDS provisions are probably of very little
theoretical or practical value as host state credible commitment devices.28 A BIT that
promises investors favorable substantive treatment, in vague terms, but that doesn’t give
the investor the right to access international arbitration to interpret and apply those terms
in an authoritative and enforceable way offers foreign investors little to no international
legal protection against opportunistic host state behavior. From that perspective, equating
BITs with no ISDS with BITs that provide access to non-ICSID ISDS is problematic. This is
especially so because arbitral alternatives to ICSID (pure ad hoc arbitration, noninstitutional arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules, institutional arbitration under the
ICC) have historically proven to be a valuable addition to the foreign investor’s legal arsenal.
Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s ad hoc contract-based arbitration produced numerous
important awards supporting the international legal principles of pacta sunt servanda and of
meaningful compensation in the event of expropriation.29 As a starting point, the legal
expert would probably suggest that BITs with no ISDS are likely to be significantly worse
for investors than are BITs with an ISDS provision consenting to ad hoc or any other kind of
arbitration.

27.

28.
29.

It is always possible for political scientists to refuse to care whether lawyers think their lawrelated theories and findings are persuasive or not. But where we are interested in explaining how
states as collective abstracts understand and experience law, it seems to me pretty relevant to
have an accurate understanding of how the lawyers who advise and constitute the state see the
law; their lawyer’s view of the law becomes the state’s view, in a sense. To not care about their
views is to devalue realism as something that political science theories should reflect. I suppose
that this devaluation may be acceptable, depending on one’s view of what the point of the research
enterprise is.
Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 33 BROOKLYN INT’L L. J. 405, 427 (2008).
Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors before Bilateral
Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1550, 1551 (2009).
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B. The Importance of Options
Move up Table 1, to the distinction between “partial” and “full” ICSID delegations.
Lawyers are trained to be sensitive to the importance of options, as the best choice will often
depend upon particular contexts and “facts on the ground” that are difficult to predict ex
ante. In the world of ISDS, it is possibly true that ICSID arbitration will be the preferred
arbitral mechanism for most investors. But it is not necessarily the preferred arbitral
mechanism for all investors. This is because context matters. ICSID represents a particular
matrix of trade-offs, and before ranking the desirability of different arbitral options we need
to understand what the arbitral consumer’s preferences actually are. For example, while
investment-treaty awards are arguably more readily enforced under ICSID than under the
New York Convention—itself an empirically undemonstrated fact—ICSID arbitrations are
also typically subject to greater demands of “transparency”, including the now-mandatory
publication of excerpts of decisions. The investor who wishes his dispute to stand a good
chance of remaining confidential might reasonably prefer UNCITRAL to ICSID.
ICSID arbitration involves other tradeoffs as well. For example, ICSID arbitrations are
subject to an annulment process that allows a limited right to appeal. UNCITRAL
arbitrations are not subject to annulment. While the New York Convention provides a
limited number of grounds upon which a state might refuse enforcement of an award, such
refusals don’t extinguish the ability of the investor to seek enforcement in another
jurisdiction. Whether ICSID annulment review is supposed to be searching or lenient is a
matter of some debate in the academic literature, as annulment committees flip-flop
between showing significant deference to lower tribunal awards and showing very little. An
investor that favors the finality of awards over their legal correctness might prefer
UNCITRAL or ICC arbitration, neither of which is subject to annulment.30
Even if we accept that ICSID provides high-quality decisions, that quality comes at a
price. Literally. The average cost of an ICSID arbitration (including lawyer’s fees) for a party
is quite high.31 And it takes, on average, three to four years, for an ICSID arbitration to
wend its way through the ICSID process, not including the time taken up by potential
annulment proceedings.32 Arbitral alternatives may be both cheaper and quicker than

30.
31.

32.
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Piero Bernardini, ICSID versus non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration, in LIBER AMICORUM
BERNARDO CREMADES 44 (describing ICSID’s annulment process as a disadvantage compared to
alternative arbitral fora).
A recent OECD study suggests that average cost to the parties for an investor-state dispute is
$8,000,000. David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-state dispute settlement: A scoping
paper for the investment policy community 18 (OECD, Working Paper No. 2012/3, 2012). The
OECD study does not provide separate cost estimates for ICSID versus non-ICSID arbitration. My
suggestion in the essay that non-ICSID arbitration may be cheaper is conjectural.
Anthony Sinclair, Louise Fisher & Sarah Macrory ICSID arbitration: how long does it take?, 4
GLOBAL
ARBITRATION
REVIEW
(2009),
available
at
http://www.goldreserveinc.com/documents/ICSID%20arbitration%20%20How%20long%20does%2
0it%20take.pdf.
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ICSID, potentially decisive criteria for aggrieved investors who don’t enjoy a significant legal
war chest of money or time.33
The viability of a BIT-based consent to ICSID also depends on the willingness of the host
state to remain a party to the ICSID Convention. A host state that withdraws from the
Convention (as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have recently done) makes an investor’s
access to ICSID via a BIT-based consent uncertain at best.34 Investors that are particularly
worried about the possibility of denunciation would greatly welcome the availability of
alternative fora, the investor’s access to which cannot be defeated by unilateral state action
since there is no institution from which formal withdrawal is possible.
In other words, from a legal perspective it probably doesn’t make much sense to suggest
that fewer options are necessarily better than more options, especially when the “more
options” category contains all of the options residing in the “fewer options” category.35 An
ISDS clause that provides for ICSID arbitration, and only for ICSID arbitration, may be
perfectly fine for most investors. It’s a belt that suffices to hold up most pairs of pants. But
some investors will find themselves in a situation in which they rationally prefer suspenders
to belts, or they discover that their belt has burst. Giving investors the option of wearing
suspenders—if they wish—hardly detracts from their preference for wearing belts in most
cases.
Another way of looking at the issue of whether less is better than more is through the
concept of “delegation.” When lawyers write arbitration clauses in ordinary international
commercial contracts, they recognize that they are removing dispute-settlement authority
from state authorities (presumed biased against the foreign party), and delegating it to
private actors. In the drafting exercise, one consideration is or should be the scope of the
delegation. But that consideration is not one of whether the delegation is to multiple arbitral
fora. It is whether to circumscribe the subject matter over which the arbitral forum is
entitled to rule. A broad (or “full”) delegation would include language such as “All disputes
arising out of or in connection with the present contract shall be finally and exclusively
settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce.” If a party
wants to limit the scope of delegation, it will replace the words “all disputes” with a more

33.
34.

35.

Bernardini, supra note 30, at 43, makes a similar point, noting that “delay” is a “critical” (e.g.
undesirable) aspect of ICSID arbitration compared to ICSID alternatives.
An important and contested legal issue is whether a state’s withdrawal under ICSID Convention
Article 71 extinguishes a state’s consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction that reside in BITs that
themselves haven’t yet been denounced—or that have been denounced but which remain in effect
as to covered investments through BIT-based continuation-of-coverage clauses. See Ignacio A.
Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America, 16 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 409, 429-430
(2010) (discussing some of the legal uncertainties related to withdrawal from ICSID).
As a recent treatise on Chinese BITs notes, “The best position for an investor with regard to
dispute resolution is to have as many options as possible for international arbitration.” NORAH
GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICIES AND PRACTICE 377
(2009).
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limiting phrase. Perhaps “all disputes relating to the quality of the delivered goods”. Or “all
disputes relating to the interpretation of this contract”.
In the IIL context, state parties have similar opportunities to limit the subject-matter
scope of their delegations to ICSID or other fora. They may, for example, define the concept
of “investment” as used in their BITs narrowly rather than broadly. ICSID’s jurisdiction is
limited to “investments” under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, and ICSID tribunals will
typically look at how the state parties to a BIT have defined investment in their investment
treaties. A state might also expressly exclude certain classes of disputes, such as disputes
over tax matters, as does Article 21 of the 2004 Model U.S. BIT. Or it may wish to maintain
its sovereignty to implement prudential financial regulations, as provided in Article 20 of the
2004 U.S. model. Or it may wish to carve out an exception for decisions related to whether a
treaty violation was necessary to protect the host state’s essential security interests, as in
Article 18 of the same model treaty. As yet another example, BITs involving Communist
countries traditionally limited their ISDS provisions to disputes over the treaty’s
expropriation provision, excluding disputes over the meaning of other treaty provisions, like
the guarantee of “fair and equitable treatment”. States may also use the ICSID Convention
itself to limit the subject-matter scope of their delegations. Article 25(4) of the Convention
allows states to notify ICSID as to the kinds of disputes that they do not wish to submit to
ICSID jurisdiction, as Ecuador recently did.
The point is that there are more natural ways for states to limit the scope of delegations
to ICSID than to decide whether to give investors the option of choosing ICSID or some
arbitral alternative. In legal terms, a “full” delegation to ICSID is one in which an investor
may submit more or less any investment dispute to ICSID, if the investor wishes to do so. A
“partial” delegation is one in which the investor’s right to access ICSID, or any other arbitral
fora, is meaningfully limited to only particular legal questions or particular kinds of
disputes.

C. A Note on the Use of Model Clauses
Contract drafting decisions may be profoundly influenced by the use of model forms and
clauses, which are often plugged into contract documents in a rather mechanical and
unreflective way.36 Even where there is some measure of bargaining over the inclusion or
exclusion of a particular kind of clause, there may be no bargaining about the actual text of
the clause that ends up being included, the model text taken as a given. There may not even
be much bargaining about the inclusion of the clause in the model form at all.
BIT negotiations are no stranger to the phenomenon of the model clause. Most capital
exporting states develop model investment treaties that serve as the beginning, and perhaps

36.
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See generally Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese”, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59
(2001).
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more or less the end, of most BIT negotiations. ISDS clauses are themselves “modeled”
within model BITs. So, for example, the Swiss model in effect in the mid-1990s contains an
ISDS clause that provides ICSID as the only ISDS option.37 The United Kingdom model
from the same period contains “alternative” ISDS clauses, from which the negotiating
partner might choose. The first names only ICSID; the second possible clause names ICSID,
ICC, and UNICTRAL arbitration.38 The 1991 German model also contains alternative ISDS
clauses, the first specifying only ICSID, the second specifying only ad hoc arbitration. The
United States’ 1994 and 2004 models contain just one ISDS clause, providing access to
ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration. Model BITs by capital importing states are more
unusual, but not unheard of. For example, Chile developed a model BIT in 1994 that
contains an ICSID-only ISDS clause.
This is not to deny that in some cases the decision to include any ISDS clause has been
controversial. Australia, for example, insisted that the United States delete ISDS from the
investment chapter of the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement.39 Some host states may also
insist on marginally weakening model ISDS text by, for example, requiring longer waiting
periods between a dispute’s crystallization and the investor’s right to access arbitration.40
Leaked texts from ongoing negotiations between the European Union and Canada also
illustrate significant if often highly technical debates over the ISDS. ISDS can be
controversial, and states can, and sometimes do, specifically negotiate over it.
The question is whether there is meaningful and regular bargaining over ISDS content
amongst the rank-ordered dimension identified by Allee and Peinhardt.41 In that regard, the
variation in model treaty practice discussed above poses some interesting apparent
anomalies. For example, why would we expect Switzerland, a small and relatively weak
capital-exporting state, to embed in its model a “full” delegation to ICSID (e.g. ICSID-only
arbitration), while the United States, certainly the materially most powerful capitalexporting country over the period of study, would handicap its initial bargaining position by
putting forward a weaker “partial” model clause? Such puzzlers pose a challenge to the
notion that less is more, at least as far as ISDS is concerned. They also may pose deeper
challenges to a “rationalist” account of investment treaty design, as the observed differences
37.
38.
39.
40.

41.

The Swiss model is reprinted in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-1990’S 273 (1998).
Id. at 279.
As described in Ann Capling & Kim Richard Nossal, Blowback: Investor-State Dispute
Mechanisms in International Trade Agreements, 19 GOVERNANCE 151, 152 (2006).
An example, cited by Allee and Peinhardt, is the 1985 BIT between the US and Turkey. Turkey
inserted a one-year waiting period in the ISDS, among other changes from the US model. The BIT
nonetheless gives the investor the right to access ICSID arbitration. See Allee & Peinhardt, supra
note 20, at 5. In contrast, the BIT with the Democratic Republic of Congo, signed around the same
time, contains a waiting period of six months. An extra six months of waiting is “marginal” in light
of the length of time it takes for the typical ICSID dispute to work through the ICSID system (a
matter of years).
See Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20, at 14-20.
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in model ISDS practice don’t on their face seem to reflect the sorts of considerations, or
understandings of interest, that Allee and Peinhardt’s theory suggests.42

V. Putting the Legal Expert’s Input Into Action
In this section I present a reconstruction of Allee and Peinhardt’s dependent variable that
reflects the first two points of legal expertise presented in the previous section (the value of
any kind of ISDS and the importance of context).43 For the purposes of this reconstruction, I
set aside the third point made above, concerning the use and content of model clauses. The
first two points can readily be used to suggest a recoding of their data without disturbing the
overarching bargaining-theory framework in which their empirical analysis takes place. The
third point uses legal expertise to suggest the desirability of a more fundamental re-thinking
of Allee and Peinhardt’s larger enterprise by calling into question the ways in which they
conceptualize states’ interests and bargaining as to the details of ISDS. Operationalizing the
third point would require a new theory, perhaps incorporating or building upon the “data” of
model treaty text, of what aspects of ISDS states might predictably bargain over. Such a
theory is beyond the scope of this Essay.
Table 2, below, illustrates the reconstruction. I think that most experts in the field of IIL
would probably consider this view to be more intuitively plausible, or “valid,” than the view
provided in Table 1. Of course, that assertion itself should, in the best of all possible worlds,
be subject to empirical verification via scientific methods. I have not scientifically surveyed
IIL experts, and my sense of what the IIL community thinks about these issues is
admittedly informal and unproven.
What are the main differences between the two Tables? First, I would consider an ISDS
clause that grants the investor access to both ICSID and other fora to be qualitatively better,
from the investor’s perspective, than one that grants access only to ICSID. Let’s rank those
clauses as “2,” or highest/best. Second, it is perhaps arguable that an ICSID-only clause is
better than a clause that provides only non-ICSID options, like UNICTRAL or ICC
arbitration. I say “perhaps arguable” because the case that ICSID is necessarily and
significantly better than the leading alternatives is not so clear, and IIL experts might view
these two treaties as roughly exchangeable.44 Finally, I think that most if not all IIL lawyers
would view BITs that contain no ISDS clause (or that limit its scope of application to a very
narrow subset of disputes) as significantly inferior to all others, and perhaps even
conceptually irrelevant, depending on the aims of the particular study.45

42.
43.
44.
45.
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See Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20, at 9-14.
See Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20, at 13-14.
See, e.g., Bernardini, supra note 30, at 90-92.
For example, a study might attempt to explain why states include any consent to ISDS in their
BITs. In that case, it would be very relevant to include observations of BITs that do not contain
ISDS, and observations that do. The practical problem is that virtually all BITs from the past 20
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Table 2: An alternative conceptualization
Rank
Order
(Higher=Better)

Concept

Operationalization

2

Multiple
fora
(including ICSID)

ICSID + other for a

1

ICSID only

ICSID arbitration

0

Single or multiple
fora (No ICSID)

UNCITRAL &/or ICC
arbitration

. (Should probably
be excluded from

No fora

No
investor-state
arbitration

analysis)
Comparing Table 1 and Table 2, we can see that the incorporation of legal expertise can
lead to very different coding decisions for particular observations. For example, the “best”
treaty in Table 1 (a BIT containing only a delegation to ICSID alone) is, in Table 2,
recorded as second best. And conversely, what is second best in Table 1 becomes the best
in Table 2.

VI. A Statistical Example
In this section I demonstrate empirically what should be pretty intuitive: recoding a
dependent variable along the lines that I have done above can, and normally should,
dramatically change the results of the statistical analysis. I present results from what I call
a “reconsideration” of Allee and Peinhardt’s original model. I should caution that what I
present is not a narrowly construed “replication.” I use a different sample and different
variables, and I rely on my own coding of ISDS clause.46
I should also emphasize that the point of this statistical exercise is really not to present
and defend (or to disprove or falsify) a theoretically informed model of state bargaining over

46.

years contain ISDS provisions, leaving no variation on the dependent variable.
My distinction between replication and reconsideration roughly tracks follows the distinction
between “verification” and “reanalysis” discussed in Paul S. Herrnson, Replication, Verification,
Secondary Analysis, and Data Collection in Political Science, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 452, 452
(1995):
Replication is not the same as reanalysis, verification, or secondary analysis. The four
terms have very different meanings. A reanalysis studies the same problem as that
investigated by the initial investigator; the same data base as that used by the initial
investigator may or may not be used. If different, independently collected data are used
to study the same problem, the reanalysis is called a replication. If the same data are
used, the reanalysis is called a verification. In a secondary analysis, data collected to
study one set of problems are used to study a different problem. Secondary analysis
frequently, but not necessarily, depends on the use of multipurpose datasets.
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BITs. My model is derived from my understanding of Allee and Peinhardt’s original theory,
but it is not precisely the same model, and it does not use the same data. For that reason,
and in part because I am not sure the underlying bargaining theory is all that persuasive to
begin with (a discussion beyond the scope of this essay), I am not particularly interested in
the substantive results for specific variables in the reconsidered analysis.
Following Allee and Peinhardt, my analysis takes the form of a panel regression. It
should be immediately obvious that this is the kind of research activity that most law
professors are not well-trained, or trained at all, to do. By presenting a statistical analysis, I
do not mean to undermine the point of the preceding sections, and the main point of this
article—that non-statistically-trained law professors will often be able to contribute
meaningfully to statistical social scientific studies of law. I am able to present such a study
because I am fortunate to have received graduate-level training in both law and political
science. But I do not claim that such interdisciplinary training is necessary to render the
typical law professor useful to the social scientific enterprise. Interdisciplinary training can
be valuable, but it also has important costs—namely, the need for the researcher to complete
two separate, intensive courses of graduate study. Furthermore, and as a prominent law
professor told me at the beginning of my career, “you have to be disciplinary before you can
be interdisciplinary.” Being “disciplinary” is hard work; it is even harder to master and keep
up with two sets of literatures, research norms, and techniques. The typical
“interdisciplinary” scholar will often be stronger in one discipline than the other, sometimes
markedly so. This is why collaboration between disciplinarians, rather than the creation of
an army of socio-legal polymaths, is the more realistic solution to the problem of “poor”
empirical legal research.
To conduct my analysis, I coded two aspects of the dispute-settlement provisions of all
publicly available BITs between 18 top capital-exporting states and their treaty partners.47
The first aspect was the focus of my early empirical studies on the question of whether BITs
promote foreign investment. My coding scheme records whether the particular BIT
guarantees the investor access to investor-initiated international arbitration for a wide
variety of treaty-related disputes with the host state.48
The second aspect is the main the focus of this paper: if the BIT contains that kind of
effective, comprehensive arbitration clause, which arbitral fora is the investor authorized to
access? This latter data collection effort mirrors Allee and Peinhardt’s own efforts. Like
them, I find significant variation. Some BITs grant access to ICSID alone, some to ICSID
and other fora, and some to other fora but not to ICSID.

47.
48.
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(1) Australia (2) Austria (3) Belgium (4) Canada (5) Denmark (6) Finland (7) France (8) Germany
(9) Great Britain (10) Italy (11) Japan (12) Netherlands (13) Norway (14) Singapore (15) Spain
(16) Sweden (17) Switzerland (18) USA.
I have called these ISDS provisions “comprehensive” in my earlier papers.
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I recorded whether each BIT contained an effective, comprehensive ISDS provision
naming any of the following arbitral fora: ICSID; UNCITRAL; ICC; Swedish Chamber of
Commerce (SCC); non-UNCITRAL (or pure) ad hoc; the ICSID Additional Facility; and
“other.” For this symposium essay, I then created two versions of a dependent variable. The
first reflects Table 1, above, and is an analogue, I think, to Allee and Peinhardt’s dependent
variable; the second reflects Table 2. In both cases, I have excluded BITs that do not contain
an effective, comprehensive ISDS clause.49
For the Table 1 version, I have coded BITs that consent to non-ICSID arbitration as “0;”
BITs that consent to ICSID arbitration and at least one other forum as “1,” and BITs that
consent to only ICSID arbitration as “2.”
For the Table 2 version, I have coded BITs that consent to non-ICSID arbitration as “0;”
BITs that consent to only ICSID as “1;” and BITs that consent to ICSID and at least one
other forum as “2.” As suggested earlier in this essay, one could also plausibly collapse Table
2’s “0” and “1” categories, as it is not at all clear that ICSID arbitration is viewed by states or
investors as necessarily and materially superior to non-ICSID arbitration.
In both versions of the DV, I elected to count a consent to the ICSID Additional Facility
(AF) as distinct from a consent to ICSID. The AF was created administratively (and not by
international treaty) to allow ICSID to arbitrate disputes involving a state party who is not a
party to the ICSID Convention itself. Importantly, AF proceedings are expressly not subject
to the ICSID Convention, which itself is the source of some of the main purported benefits of
ICSID arbitration. AF proceedings should probably then be viewed as inferior to ICSID
proceedings—or at least not quite equivalent.
Another difficulty is that some BITs contain ISDS clauses that appear to give the investor
multiple options, but in reality provide mutually exclusive options. For example, many
Australian BITs grant access to UNCITRAL arbitration, but only as long as either one or
both of the states are not members of the ICSID Convention. If both states are ICSID
members, then the UNCITRAL option disappears, and ICSID arbitration becomes the only
possibility.50 Complex ISDS provisions like these are rare, however, and I have elected to
treat them as if they contain consents to ICSID and other fora (e.g. a “1” in Table 1’s scheme,
and a “2” in Table 2’s scheme).

49.

50.

So, for example, BITs that do not give the investor any right to arbitration are not included in my
analysis. I also exclude BITs with “promissory” or “partial” ISDS clauses, as those terms are used
in my earlier studies. “Partial” ISDS clauses are were overwhelmingly entered into by Soviet-era
Communist countries and limited the scope of the states’ consent to arbitration to a narrowly
defined class of disputes. Since the collapse of the USSR BITs with partial ISDS clauses are
exceedingly rare.
ISDS clauses that consent to both ICSID arbitration and to the Additional Facility are similar to
Australia’s either-or ISDS clause in the sense that if both the home and host state are members of
the ICSID Convention, arbitration under the AF rules becomes impossible.
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Following Allee and Peinhardt, I include a selection of independent variables. Here, my
aim was to build a model that is roughly analogous to theirs, by using readily available data
that reflects their basic bargaining theory as I understand it. The model is intended to
provide the structure in which we can examine the sensitivity of statistical results to
changes in the coding of the DV. My intent here is not to test whether Allee and Peinhardt’s
theory is confirmed or disproved, nor am I interested in the results (as mentioned above).
However, it is probably worth discussing in a bit of detail the construction of each of the
variables, and their theoretical purposes. In the discussion of the model results, further
below, I will also briefly mention the theoretical implications of the results, even if I view
these results—as opposed to their sensitivity—as being of relatively minor interest here.
Four variables tap the home state’s ISDS preferences, as elaborated by Allee and
Peinhardt:
(1) A measure of home state’s FDI outflows as a percent of home state’s GDP. This
variable reflects Allee and Peinhardt’s argument that home states with a large
number of corporations engaged in FDI will face stronger domestic political
pressure to negotiate strong ISDS provisions. This measure comes from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).51 The WDI dataset does not
contain FDI outflow data for Belgium, so Belgium is excluded from my empirical
analysis.
(2) A dummy variable indicating whether the host state was a post-World War II
colony of the home state. Allee and Peinhardt argue that ex-colonial masters will
have an incentive to be more lenient in ISDS negotiations with their ex-colonies.
It should be pointed out, however, that outside of Great Britain and France,
none of the home states in my sample had significant post-war colonial
empires.52
(3) The durability of the host state’s Polity IV (democracy) rating. The durability
indicator measures the number of years since a major change in the state’s
Polity rating. Allee and Peinhardt suggest that home states will view more
durable regimes as less likely to take actions harmful to investors, and will thus
be less likely to insist on strong ISDS. The Polity measure of democracy is
widely used in political science.
51.

52.
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Allee and Peinhardt also include measures of the home country’s embrace of “rule of law”
principles, but their rule of law variable is insignificant in their analyses. I have elected not to
include such a variable here, as the capital exporting countries in my sample have uniformly high
rule of law scores; the values of the scores vary very little year-to-year; and rule of law data has
been collected by the World Bank only since 1996. See Allee & Peinhardt, supra note 20, at 19.
There is indeed some evidence that colonial status can influence BIT practice, though not quite in
the way suggested by Allee and Peinhardt. France, for example, had a policy of refusing to enter
into BITs with those of its ex-colonies who were part of the CFA monetary regime. Patrick
Juillard, Les conventions bilaterales d'investissement concludes par la France [Bilateral
Investment Conventions Concluded by France], 106 J. DROIT INT'L 274, 282-83 (1979).
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(4) The host state’s Polity IV democracy rating. More democratic countries may be
viewed as having stronger preferences for the rule of law, or as having greater
ability to credibly commit to treating investors favorably. Allee and Peinhardt
argue that home states will see less need to insist on strong ISDS when a host
state respects the rule of law.
I include two variables arguably tapping the host state’s ISDS preferences:
(5) The host state’s GDP growth rate, taken from the WDI. Allee and Peinhardt
argue that host states that are experiencing strong economic performance will
have fewer incentives to agree to a strong ISDS clause (because they will have
less objective need for the additional FDI that a strong ISDS clause might
promote).
(6) A dummy variable indicating whether the host state has any outstanding loans
(credits) from the World Bank, taken from the WDI. Allee and Peinhardt suggest
that host states in debt to the World Bank will be more likely to accept strong
ISDS clauses.
Allee and Peinhardt argue that if home states generally prefer strong ISDS, and host
states generally prefer weak ISDS, then the outcome of a bargaining situation over ISDS
strength should depend on the parties’ relative bargaining power. Like them, I include:
(7) A measure of the difference between the home state’s and the host state’s GDP,
from the WDI.
Finally, I also include:
(8) A dummy variable indicating whether the host state has signed the ICSID
Convention prior to signing the particular BIT. The dummy reflects the fact that
a BIT-based consent to ICSID is ineffective, absent a state’s membership in
ICSID. I suspect that where the host state has not signed the ICSID Convention,
the home state will be more likely to include a non-ICSID option in the ISDS.
(9) A year counter to control for the probability that ISDS- or BIT-drafting practices
evolve over time. We see clear evidence of such evolution over the long term, as
initially BITs never or rarely included ISDS, while today BITs almost always
contain ISDS.
Because BITs did not contain ISDS provisions prior to the 1970s (and did not regularly
include ISDS until the mid 1980s), I begin my analysis in 1970. I collected ISDS data up
through 2002. All variable values are for the year of BIT signature.
I estimate the model using ordered probit, with robust standard errors (clustered around
home countries).53 Clustering around home countries helps control for the possibility that
there are specific home-country differences in ISDS preferences or negotiating behavior.
More concretely, we can think of clustering as controlling for the fact that home countries

53.

The regressions were performed using the -oprobit- command in Stata 12.
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base their negotiations on very different model ISDS clauses. Table 3 provides results for the
Allee and Peinhardt version of the dependent variable. Table 4 provides results for the
reconsidered dependent variable.
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Table 3: Determinants of ISDS Strength, Allee & Peinhardt Construction of Dependent
Variable (ICSID-only As Best)

Table 4: Determinants of ISDS Strength, Reconsidered Construction of Dependent
Variable (ICSID + Alternatives As Best)
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First look at Table 3. The first four variables, all in theory measuring home state
preferences for strong ISDS, are statistically insignificant. Of the two variables arguably
measuring host state preferences, only Host GDP Growth is significant, but it is wrongly
signed. The positive coefficient suggests that better-performing host states are more likely to
accept strong ISDS clauses, in apparent tension with Allee and Peinhardt’s theory. Finally,
note that the two variables I’ve added—whether the host state had signed the ICSID
Convention prior to signing the BIT, and the year counter, are both highly statistically
significant. Host states that have not signed the ICSID Convention are less likely to accept
strong ISDS (where strong means “only ICSID”, as Allee and Peinhardt argue), and, over
time, ISDS provisions have become weaker.54
Now examine Table 4. Given my re-conceptualization and re-operationalization of the
dependent variable, it’s not surprising to find that the statistical results are quite different,
both in terms of significance and sign. Indeed, illustrating this sensitivity is the main point
of my statistical reconsideration. Three of the four “home state” variables are now significant
at the <.10 level, but their coefficients tell a conflicting story. The negative sign on Home
FDI Outflows suggest that home states with more outward foreign investment demand
weaker rather than stronger ISDS, while the positive sign for the host Polity variable
suggests that home states demand stronger ISDS from more-democratic host states. Both
suggestions seem in conflict with Allee and Peinhardt’s theory. On the other hand, the
results for the Host Colony variable support their predictions. Home states seem more likely
to enter into BITs with weaker ISDS provisions when the bargaining partner is an excolony, though recall that the only two home countries with significant ex-colonial empires
here are Britain and France. As to the two host-state variables, the IBRD credits variable is
significant—though Host GDP Growth no longer is—but it is wrongly signed from the
perspective of Allee and Peinhardt’s theory. Finally, note that the sign has switched on the
year counter, which remains highly significant. Now, BITs become stronger with time.

VII. Conclusion
Traditionally trained legal experts may believe that they are unable to evaluate or
contribute to statistical analyses of legal phenomena because they don’t understand the
underlying statistical theory or mathematical operations. Statistics can mystify, and
mystification means that the mystified object must be accepted or rejected as a matter of
faith rather than as a result of careful, reasoned legal analysis. But as I suggest in this
Essay, legal experts need not be trained in the latest statistical methods to play a
meaningful and constructive role in empirical debates about legal phenomena. That role can
be critical, but it can also be collaborative. Working with the non-lawyer social scientist, the
legal expert—whether serving as co-author, or consultant, or even peer-reviewer—can use
54.
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his legal expertise (his informally empirical sense of how the law really works) to evaluate
and to suggest improvements in the ways in which methodologically sophisticated social
scientists translate legal phenomena into the numerical categories and values that make
statistical analysis possible. The result, hopefully, will be more conceptually sound, accurate
studies of legal phenomena that nonetheless provide persuasive empirical support for useful
theories.
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